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The Relevance of the EEC Experience to Additional Prospective
Sectoral Integration Between Canada and the United States
by Hans Smit*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most successful and comprehensive attempts at voluntary economicintegration' in recent times have all occurred in Western Europe. En-
couraged by the early success of the BENELUX Customs Union,2 the
countries of Western Europe, ever since they emerged from the Second
World War, have sought to integrate, both politically and economically,
in a variety of ways. At the root of these attempts have been two princi-
pal motivations. First, the economic and political might, displayed by
the United States in the war, persuaded the Europeans that they could
continue to play a leading role in the post-war world only if they man-
aged to combine into an economic and political union of the approximate
size of the United States. Second, it was increasingly recognized that
trade could not develop properly unless national barriers were removed.
While the advantages of integration were broadly recognized, the
attempts at effectuating it ran into political obstacles. Various forms of
integration and cooperation were devised, but few came into existence.
The French-Italian Customs Union agreement was never ratified. The
European Defense Community was voted down by the French Parlia-
ment. The OEEC and the Council of Europe came into being, but these
were consultative and cooperative organizations that lacked the institu-
tional framework necessary to effective integration.3
As is so often the case, it required an industry that was in great
difficulties, for which no other solutions appeared appropriate, to over-
come the political antipathy to integration. The European coal and steel
industry was in a most depressed state when Robert Schuman launched
his famous "Schuman Plan," seeking the establishment of a common
* Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, and Director of the Parker School of Foreign And Com-
parative Law, Columbia University. Co-author, H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EURO-
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY (1981). Professor Smit has
practiced in the corporate and international fields, and has written widely on trade and EEC related
matters.
I This paper will not consider the measures toward economic integration taken in the context
of COMECON. For a discussion of COMECON, see HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMrr, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1120-21 (1980).
2 See id at 1071.
3 On the various efforts made, as well as on the OEEC (now the OECD) and the Council of
Europe, see id. at 1071-72.
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market in coal and crude steel. The European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC) Treaty became effective in July 23, 1952. It ushered in a
new epoch in European economic and political conditions.'
The ECSC Treaty brought revolutionary change. It provided not
only for a customs union, eliminating internal tariff and setting a com-
mon tariff structure for imports from abroad, but created a supranational
structure for governing the community, comprised of a legislative branch
(the Council), an executive branch (the High Authority), and a judicial
branch (the Court of Justice).
The experience with the ECSC was so overwhelmingly favorable
that the pressures towards further integration became irresistible. At
first, it was integration in other sectors that was urged. The difficulties
encountered in the agricultural sector lent impetus to proposals for a so-
called "green pool." 5 But the six nations of Europe that were bound by
the ECSC Treaty became bold and courageous. In less than a year, they
drafted and negotiated the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC), which became effective on January 1, 1958.6
The EEC Treaty provided for a transitional period of twelve years,
subdivided into three four-year periods, within which the customs union
and other elements were to be implemented. In fact, the customs union
was achieved ahead of this schedule.' Other elements created significant
problems, especially the market organizations in the agricultural field.
However, in due course, the basic structures were established. 8 Un-
doubtedly the most remarkable feature of these developments is the role
played by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. It can
fairly be said that it has been the principle instrument in making the
European Communities work.9
The European developments permit most useful insights for those
who plan integration in other areas of the world. It is therefore appropri-
ate that they be studied by those intent upon further integration in the
relations between the United States and Canada. This will facilitate eval-
uation of the various kinds of integration and its benefits and drawbacks.
II. SECTORAL INTEGRATION
A. The Various Forms of Sectoral Integration
Sectoral integration is the integration of national markets in a par-
ticular sector of commerce, such as coal,"° atomic energy," wheat, 2 or
4 See idt, at 1072.
5 A "green pool" is a common market in agricultural products.
6 The most comprehensive work in English on the EEC is H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY (1981).
7 Id. at 2:39.
8 On the market organizations in the agricultural field, see id. at 2:186.
9 See id at 5:255.
10 The ECSC Treaty integrated the markets in coal and crude steel.
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automobiles."3 This integration can take various forms. It can take the
form of a free trade area, in which internal tariff barriers are removed but
each state retains its own tariffs on imports from third countries. It can
take the form of a customs union, in which internal tariff disarmament is
coupled with a common external tariff. Or it can take the form of a
customs union in which the regulation of the economic forces affecting
the market is entrusted to transnational institutions.
The ECSC and EEC are of the latter type. It creates more signifi-
cant political problems because the assignment of regulatory powers to
transnational institutions necessarily brings along corresponding curtail-
ment of the powers of national institutions. The latter is looked upon
askance by protagonists of national sovereign power.
Nevertheless, as the European examples clearly show, true and ef-
fective integration does require regulation by institutions of the inte-
grated market. Unless such institutions are given the requisite powers,
the operation of the integrated market can be impeded or frustrated by
national measures. This is particularly true in the case of provisions re-
lating to the integrated market that are not self-executing. Self-executing
provisions can be enforced by national institutions-most significantly,
the national courts.14 But when implementation of provisions that are
not self-executing is required, a state or its institutions15 can stand in the
way of integration by refusing to provide the necessary implementation.16
The importance of transnational regulation and enforcement is high-
lighted by a most interesting decision made by the Court of Justice in
1976."7 This case concerned Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, which pro-
vides: "Each Member State shall during the first stage [Ze., the first four
years] ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle
that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work." An air
hostess, relying on Article 119, brought an action in a Belgian court seek-
11 The Euratom Treaty created a common market for nuclear energy.
12 One of the special market organizations created pursuant to the provisions of the EEC
Treaty is that for cereals. See supra note 6, at 2:336.29.
13 The AutoPact is the prime example of sectoral integration in automobiles. On the
AutoPact, see S. Reisman, Canada-United States Free-Trade (paper delivered at Conference on U.S.-
Canadian Economic Relations, the Brookings Institution, April 10, 1984).
14 While national courts may be influenced by nationalistic tendencies, their independence does
provide a significant guarantee of impartiality. Indeed, national courts are perhaps the most effective
institutions enforcing international obligations. On this function of national courts, see Scelle, Le
Phinometie Juridique de Didoublement Fonctionnel, in FESTSCHRIFr FUER HANS WEHBERG 324
(Schaetzel ed. 1956).
15 National courts, especially in politically charged cases, may be more reluctant to construe
international agreements to be self-executing than transnational institutions. See infra text accompa-
nying note 17.
16 Such refusal would constitute a breach of the state's international obligations that, for lack
of an international enforcement mechanism, may go unsanctioned.
17 Defrene v. Soci&6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Airiene Sabena, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 455.
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ing equality of pay to her male counterpart. It was admitted that both
did the same work.
The question of whether Article 119 supported the claim was sub-
mitted to the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty,
which provides for reference of questions of Community law, by national
courts, to the Court of Justice. The Court ruled that Article 119 became
self-executing, at the end of the first stage, for men and women doing the
same work. It rejected the argument that Article 119, by its terms,
merely imposes an obligation on Member States and that it speaks only
of the "principle" of equal pay for equal work, although both elements
appeared to support the view that Article 119 contemplated
implementation.
Even more striking was the Court's dismissal of the argument that
both the Member States and the EEC Commission had steadfastly acted
on the assumption that Article 119 was not self-executing. In fact, the
Member States, on the eve of the expiration of the first stage, had
adopted a resolution delaying the implementation of Article 119 until
December 31, 1964. And on February 10, 1975, the Council had
adopted a directive, allowing Member States a period of a year to imple-
ment the principle of Article 119. Even the Commission, normally intent
upon giving an interpretation to the Treaty that favors its reach and ef-
fectiveness, had failed to take the position that Article 119 was self-exe-
cuting. It had merely threatened to take Member States to court for their
failure to implement Article 119. The Court waved all of this aside. The
practice of Member States and the Commission could not change the
Treaty as the Court saw it.
The case illustrates not only the indispensability of transnational
regulation of an integrated market, but also underlines the necessity of
dealing comprehensively with the forces that operate in that market.1 8 It
is especially in the case of sectoral integration that comprehensive regula-
tion may be most difficult.
B. The Difficulty of Effectively Integrating Sectoral Markets
A state's economy comprehends a great variety of complex market
forces. It would appear most difficult to effectively separate out any par-
ticular sector or product without extensive regulation designed to avoid
the impact of distortions created either by private or governmental ac-
tion.19 The problems of insulating a particular sector are best managed
when the product involved is a raw material, such as coal. But even the
mining of coal involves labor and capital whose movements may be af-
18 If one Member State pays its female work force considerably less than its male counterpart,
market forces may be distorted to the disadvantage of the Member State that does not discriminate.
19 For example, a Member State may subsidize labor and capital in that sector of the market to
support ailing industry; or the entrepreneurs may, by private agreement, fix prices, territories, quo-
tas and the like.
[VCol. 10:53 1985]
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fected by private or public action in other sectors of the economy.2° And
the problem of separately dealing with a particular sector increases when
the product involved goes through an increasing number of production
stages.
At each of the production stages, the potential effect of market
forces operating in other sectors increases. For example, when national
markets for coal are integrated, the integration may be affected by private
or public action relating to movement of labor or capital into or out of
the coal market. If the market in a product that goes through various
production stages, and is composed of a great many materials, is inte-
grated, the movement of labor and capital into the various stages, and the
markets in the constituent materials, may be affected by private or public
action. Since effective integration must deal with all of the market forces
affecting the product, integration limited to a particular sector becomes
increasingly difficult as the product becomes more complex.
Of course, if only a free-trade area or customs union is created, the
integration may limit itself to internal tariff disarmament and, in the case
of a customs union, creation of a common external tariff. But the Euro-
pean experience has taught that this is not enough if the integrated mar-
ket is to be protected from undue distortions resulting either from
government regulation or private action affecting economic forces oper-
ating in the integrated market.
The ECSC Treaty creates not only a customs union, it also provides
for regulation of the economic forces operating in the newly created unit
by transnational institutions. And the EEC Treaty, which seeks integra-
tion of the markets of the Member States in all sectors of the economy
(except coal, steel and atomic energy) does the same.21 Since proper
sectoral integration, in order to be truly effective, requires transnational
regulation and enforcement-which may create political problems-the
question naturally arises whether a different, politically more palatable,
approach may not be preferable.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
One such approach is that which seeks to eliminate artificial obsta-
cles to the free flow of trade by international agreement which does not
provide for transnational regulation.22 It may be used in addition to pro-
viding for a sectoral free trade area or customs union. Under a func-
tional approach, government procurement programs, investment
20 For example, the government may subsidize manufacturers of equipment used in both min-
ing coal as well as in other sectors of the economy.
21 Both Treaties, for example, specifically prohibit or regulate governmental subsidies and pri-
vate contractual market arrangements. See European Economic Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (Arts. 85-90, 92-94).
22 See generally DEP'T INT'L TRADE (CANADA), How TO SECURE AND ENHANCE CANADIAN
ACCESS TO EXPORT MARKETS: DISCUSSION PAPER (1984).
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subsidies, export subsidies, tax advantages and the like, may be elimi-
nated or curtailed. The functional approach may avoid the necessity of
transnational regulation and enforcement, but it cannot deal effectively
and comprehensively with all artificial distortions of the free flow of mar-
ket forces.23
The absence of transnational institutions and policing enhances the
possibilities of adversarial politicking. While a sectoral free-trade area,
or customs union, combined with an approach seeking to ensure a proper
functioning of the market through self-policed international agreement is
certainly preferable to the status quo, the responsible, effective, and (it
would appear) politically more attractive approach, seeks to impose a
new structure within which the integrated market is to operate.
IV. THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH
A. The Essence of the Structural Approach
The structural approach goes beyond creating merely a free trade
area, or customs union, coupled with contractual safeguards against uni-
lateral distortion by the trading partners. It recognizes that, if an inte-
grated market is created, its proper operation must be safeguarded by an
institutional structure that is not dependent on the will of any trading
partner. Such a structure must be able to independently apply the rules
agreed upon, create those necessary for the proper implementation of the
basic rules, and adjudicate and settle disputes that may arise under these
rules. The ECSC, the EEC, and the Euratom Treaties are all squarely
based on this recognition. The structures elaborated in these treaties
have generally worked well, and it is this type of structure that merits
close study and emulation by the protagonists of United States-Canadian
integration.
B. The Political Feasibility of Comprehensive Integration
The objection may be advanced that structural integration, although
desirable, is politically not feasible. After all, the United States and Can-
ada lost an historic opportunity to create a comprehensive free-trade area
after World War II, when the political climate was most propitious.2
The AutoPact has been a reasonable success, but Canadian political anxi-
ety about being overwhelmed by its larger neighbor to the south seems
unabated. Efforts to overcome this anxiety may again draw effectively
upon the European experience.
23 The experience under the EEC Treaty has demonstrated that affirmative regulation and
transnational enforcement are essential. For example, the EEC antitrust provisions did require im-
plementation, and came to be enforced effectively only after the EEC provided the appropriate
mechanisms. See supra note 6, at 3:53. Similarly, the elimination of inequalities resulting from
different direct and indirect taxes requires affirmative action by transnational institutions. See id. at
3:425.
24 See S. Reisman, supra note 13, at 15-17.
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The Europeans first embarked upon integration with great reluc-
tance and, similar to the North Americans, they provided only for
sectoral integration, albeit of a more comprehensive kind. Their first ef-
fort produced the European Coal and Steel Community. When this
proved a success, the Europeans considered additional sectoral integra-
tion.25 But they ran into the same problems that confront the North
Americans today.
Sectoral integration is attractive only if both parties expect to gain
from it, and there are few sectors in which that condition can be met.
The great advantage of comprehensive integration is that the advantages
gained by one partner, in one sector, can be offset by advantages to the
other partner in other sectors. As a result, political opposition in the
participating countries becomes more diffuse, and support more compre-
hensive. In a real sense, therefore, comprehensive integration is politi-
cally easier than sectoral integration.26
Furthermore, structural integration brings very significant political
advantages to the less powerful partner. While before integration it had
no significant say in decisions that affected primarily its more powerful
partner, structural integration necessarily gives it authority in all matters
affecting the integrated market-including that of its partner. Thus, for
example, a member of the EEC like Holland, rather than being over-
whelmed by its larger partners, has played a role in EEC developments
that certainly is disproportionate to its size and political power. Perhaps
the most famous initiative, the Mansholt Plan, which set the pattern for
all agricultural regulation in the EEC, was the brain child of a Dutch
commissioner." Paul Henri Spaak, the Belgian statesman, was an early
leading force for integration in Europe. If anything, it may be fairly said
that structural integration enhances the political power and influence of
the junior partner.
C. The Role of Canada in a System of Structural Integration
The following is a brief review of how Canada might influence issues
of North American concern more effectively and significantly, within the
structure of an integrated market, than it can at present. The integrated
structure must have (and exercise) legislative, executive and judicial pow-
ers. In the EEC, these powers have been granted, respectively, to the
Council of Ministers (and to some extent to the European Parliament),
the Commission, and the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
25 For example, they considered a so-called "green pool." See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
26 It is, indeed, little short of miraculous that the six Member States of the original EEC man-
aged to overcome all of their historical differences and nationalistic prejudices in agreeing upon
structural integration of their economics. It was in no mean measure the comprehensive scope of the
integration that facilitated this agreement.
27 See generally supra note 6, at 2:336.25.
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Similar institutions would have to be created by the United States-Cana-
dian Community.
Certainly, at least in the beginning stages, Council decisions would
require unanimity.28 This would ensure Canada of effective participation
in the legislative process. Similarly, in the Commission, Canada could
protect itself against imposition of executive decisions against its will by
requiring a qualified majority for important decisions.29 Most impor-
tantly, in the Court of Justice, Canadian justices would decide, together
with United States justices, the disputes which would arise under Com-
munity law.30
It is the latter aspect that appears to offer immensely attractive pros-
pects for Canadian and United States lawyers alike. The Court of Justice
of the European Communities has played a most prominent role in fur-
thering European integration, and it is likely a United States-Canadian
Court of Justice would do the same.
D. The United States Attitude
The political advantages of structural integration to Canada would
appear so significant that the question arises whether the United States
would readily agree to such integration. The political obstacles in the
United States should certainly not be underestimated, especially now
that protectionist tendencies are again strong in the Congress. However,
structural integration would bring the United States at least two substan-
tial benefits: it would grant the United States some measure of formal
authority over what is already de facto (at least insofar as the United
States is concerned) a single market;31 and, it would further promote the
free trade which the United States has consistently espoused since the
Second World War.
The time has come for a bold new approach. It would appear en-
tirely appropriate that it be taken by two countries that, despite their
differences, are culturally, politically and economically as closely allied
as are Canada and the United States.
28 This was the approach adopted by the EEC. Even today, unanimity on important decisions
remains the rule. See supra note 6, at 5:120.
29 The EEC Treaty endorses the principles of weighted voting and qualified majorities for im-
portant decisions by the Council. See Treaty supra note 21 (Art. 148). This is a realistic and effc-
tive approach that merits emulation. Equal votes would be likely to paralyze efforts to achieve
effective integration.
30 For such a court, an equal number of justices for each partner, with a United States presi-
dent, would appear to be an attractive solution.
31 More than 70% of Canada's exports go to the United States. Next is Japan, with little more
than 5%, supra note 22, at 7. In 1983, Canada's exports to the United States amounted to more than
$50 billion. Fry, Sectoral Free Trade, 3 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Sept./Oct. 1984).
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